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Writing of Cold War historiography, Richard Aldrich, the historian of GCHQ, agrees with Christopher 
Andrew, the historian of MI5:  
shortly after VJ-Day, something rather odd happens. In the words of [Andrew], the world’s 
leading intelligence historian, we are confronted with the sudden disappearance of signals 
intelligence from the historical landscape. This is an extraordinary omission which, according 
to Andrew, has “seriously distorted the study of the Cold War”1 
The same can be said for the way that the near absence of branches of the secret state has distorted 
the historiography of post-war computing. This lacuna has been pointed out recently for the 
American case by Paul Ceruzzi. Historians, he felt, have ‘done a terrible job, because they have failed 
to chronicle the critical work done by the NSA [National Signals Agency] and other related agencies 
in computing.2 While he identified a few notable exceptions, I think the point stands: the work that 
has been done is patchy, and the overall significance of the secret state has not yet been assessed. In 
this paper I survey the UK case, piecing together what we might reliably know.  
For the British secret state, signals intelligence, primarily the successor to Bletchley Park, the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was most likely the most important agency in 
the story of computing. Other organisations also have had strong interests in information 
management, data processing and associated technologies. These other bodies would include the 
Security Service (aka MI5, the counter-intelligence agency), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, aka 
MI6, which ran spies abroad), the central bureaucratic apparatus (parts of the Ministry of Defence, 
including the Defence Intelligence Staff, and Cabinet Office, such as the Joint Intelligence Committee 
or JIC), and indeed the security-related wings of the police force. All of these are largely invisible in 
the historiography of computing. The primary cause for the disappearance, of course, is not a 
mystery: UK authorities believed that the intelligence services could only operate in conditions of 
extreme secrecy.  
But the effect of such secrecy has been two-fold. We don’t have the sources, the evidence, in the 
form of access to reliable, official documents, to make the extensive and sound historical inquiries 
we wish. Furthermore, we have not asked the counterfactual question: even if we don’t know, at the 
level of complete sources, what happened, what can we say about the possible influence of the 
secret state anyway? In the following I will review the available sources, offer a series of hypotheses, 
and discuss the evidence for them.  
What sources do we have? 
First, we have some substantial, recently published secondary sources on the main branches of the 
secret state. Some of these are official and some unofficial. Christopher Andrew’s The Defence of the 
Realm, is, as the subtitle tells us, an authorized history of MI5. His book was essentially 
commissioned to mark the centenary of the organisation, which fell in 2009. Andrew was given 
access to a portion at least of MI5’s 400,000 file archive, and his role was as an ‘independent 
historian’, although inevitably he had to strike a ‘balance in the text between openness and the 
protection of national security’, a necessity which entailed ‘a complex and demanding exercise 
requiring many hours of detailed discussion’3. An official history of MI6 was also published around 
the centenary, but only covers the first fifty years of the organisation.4 GCHQ is the subject of 
Richard Aldrich’s unauthorised study, a remarkable and detailed account of the key site of UK code-
breaking and signals intelligence.5 Aldrich’s study was ‘compiled from open sources, and no classified 
material was used’, and benefitted from a period in the mid- to late-1990s when more documents 
were released at Kew in the spirit of making government more accountable through greater 
openness.6 Aldrich chose not to interview ‘former British officials’ for ‘legal reasons’. In addition to 
these monographs, there is further secondary literature that examines aspects of how the secret 
state has operated and intersected with other foci of historical interest, such as foreign policy.7 
Second, we can look to see what historians have been able to find out about the situation in other 
countries. These countries have significantly different regimes of secrecy and rules over the release 
of documents. The most important other country is the United States. Not only was the United 
States the UK’s senior partner in the Cold War, and the leader in information technologies, but also 
more information has been released that enables us to have a better picture of American secret 
computing compared to the British case.  There exists, for example, an only partly-redacted history 
of pre-NSA and NSA computing, covering the years 1930 to 1960, written by an academic historian 
who was temporarily admitted behind the fence.8 From this book alone we find out that, while the 
relationship had ups and downs, there is substantial evidence behind the claim that the NSA 
emerged to ‘become one of world’s largest data processors’, ‘a computer leader’, and a ‘the largest 
single user of advanced computing machines in the world’.9 
Third, historians of computing have examined the post-war UK secret state where sources have been 
available, but these are few and far between. Martin Campbell-Kelly in his history of ICL, published in 
the 1989, unsurprisingly makes no mention of GCHQ.10 Simon Lavington, who was granted special 
access, has been able to describe the digital cryptanalytical GCHQ projects of the first post-war 
decade.11  
Fourth, a trickle of primary sources relating to post-war secret computing has begun to be released 
at the National Archives, and can be studied at Kew. These primary sources, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
relate to the least sensitive, most mundane aspects. Even when they are available they are often 
missing technical detail, or are incomplete, still having parts retained under the Official Secrets Act. 
Nevertheless, these sources are invaluable. The pre-1945 records are much more substantial, and, 
through reconstruction of trajectories, might help us speculate about developments and concerns, 
particularly in the immediate post-war years. 
The shroud of secrecy is thickest over the primary sources relating to the core institutions of the 
secret state – GCHQ, MI5, MI6, the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Cabinet Office. But the 
influence of secret computing may be found around the edges, as the demands of secret computing 
affect, enrol and shape the civilian world. I have therefore been on the watch for evidence of such 
influence in the records of civil bodies, such as those relating to the police, universities, and 
government research establishments.  
Finally, there is information in the public realm which addresses the secret state, secret computing 
included, which goes further than the above sources, but is harder to judge in terms of reliability, 
since their claims are not necessarily secured by citations to traceable documents. These sources are 
various: the results of investigative journalism, the claims of whistle-blowers, anonymous 
contributions to Wikipedia, and the historical writing by authors whose aim is not history of an 
academic standard. Such material is not used here. 
There is no easy way to estimate the volume of documents and other sources that would be 
valuable to the historian that are at present inaccessible. Certainly the core institutions have 
retained documents that reach back to the beginnings – and beyond - of the period under study 
here. Furthermore, GCHQ, for example, has its own museum, containing artefacts - a few of which 
have occasionally been shown in public (for example in the Science Museum’s temporary 
Codebreaker exhibition, which closed in 2013). None of these inaccessible documents or sources is 
used here. 
 
What hypotheses can we make? 
I will propose seven hypotheses, and then turn to see what evidence from primary and secondary 
sources might address them. First, the UK secret state was a major user of computing technologies, 
and within the secret state, signals intelligence (and codebreaking) was the heaviest user. Second, 
signals intelligence generates computing tasks characterised by large quantities of data subjected to 
speedy, repetitive, relatively simple analysis. We would therefore expect the demands to be on size 
of memories, peripheral technologies (storage of data), and fast computing. Third, the demands of 
the secret state in computing shaped the development of the computer industry. Fourth, in this 
interaction with industry there were opportunity costs, for example that the absorption of  trained 
staff drew skills and knowledge away from civil sectors and from military non-secret state sectors. 
Fifth, in common with the rest of Whitehall, which I have made the subject of a separate substantial 
study, mechanisation and computerisation of clerical tasks was widespread and significantly shaped 
capacity for administration.12 Sixth, technological innovations that originated in response to 
problems raised by the secret state sometimes spread out to civil applications. Finally, my seventh 
hypothesis is that security was a constraint, raising its own problems which in turn invited socio-
technical solutions. 
 
What do we know? 
(1) The Secret State as a Major User of Computing Technologies 
Of course, the secret state is part of the canonical history of computing. But these appearances are 
rare and selective. Most well-known is the work of the Government Code and Cypher School, also 
known as Bletchley Park. It was there that Turing, and many others, gathered to attack German 
coded messages.  
The immense, current cultural interest in Bletchley Park has several motivations. There is fascination 
in, and uses of, the tragic story of Turing himself. Most powerfully Turing’s life and work has become 
an icon and rallying point in LGBT politics. This interest has motivated the best historical work on 
Turing in the form of Hodges’ biography.13 Second, there is the attraction of the secret, compounded 
by the fact that a silence, partly officially but also partly self-imposed, around Bletchley Park 
activities lasted until the 1970s. The subsequent rush of information, all the more emotionally-
charged for having been pent up so long, has given Bletchley Park extraordinary prominence. Third, 
there is a narrative, inflected with nationalism, that celebrates Bletchley Park as a distinctively British 
contribution to the defeat of Nazism: it was by brain-power not brute production (undercutting 
claims that it was Russian and American contributions that were decisive), it is presented as amateur 
(it was anything but), and it is nostalgic.  
At Bletchley Park, the signals intelligence (sigint), collected by outlying stations, was channelled and 
made subject to cryptanalytical attack. The messages coded using the Enigma machines were subject 
to human and machine (‘bombe’) analysis. The messages encrypted using a cipher machine 
codenamed ‘Tunny’ were processed by Colossus, the extraordinary electronic valve-based, symbol-
manipulating machine designed and built by the General Post Office team under Thomas H. Flowers. 
The first Colossus was built in 1943. Ten Colossi were in operation by 1945. 
We should remember that Bletchley Park was an industrial operation: large-scale, focused on speed 
and flow, with innovation and mechanisation at reverse salients (in the sense used by historian of 
technology Thomas P. Hughes). I made this observation in The Government Machine (2003). Other 
historians agree. Aldrich writes of the wartime sigint sites: ‘All of them were symptomatic of an 
industrial revolution in secret intelligence: both Bletchley Park and the outstations operated like 
factories, with three gruelling shifts each day’.14 Copeland describes the ‘two vast steel-framed 
buildings’ that housed the Colossi as ‘a factory dedicated to breaking Tunny’.15 
It is precisely the scale of such operations that suggests that the secret state is probably an 
important and under-estimated factor in shaping the history of post-war computing. In April 1946, 
British codebreaking moved from Bletchley Park to Eastcote in London. The centre also had a new 
name, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Of the ten Colossi, two moved to 
Eastcote. (Lavington has the two Colossus II machines being assembled at Eastcote.16)The rest were 
supposedly destroyed. Aldrich writes, almost certainly erroneously:  
Much of the machinery was broken up, including examples of the mighty ‘Colossus’ 
computational machine. However, Professor Max Newman, who had been central to its 
development, managed to secure two ‘Colossus’ machines for his new computing 
department at Manchester University. These were transported by the Ministry of War 
Transport at the price of thirty-four shillings a ton. Newman offered to send a junior 
university lecturer down ‘to sit on the van’ to make sure that the precious machines were 
not damaged in transit.17 
One possibility is that Newman was in fact involved in the move of the two Colossi to Eastcote. 
Historian J.V. Field, in partial support of this interpretation, says that Manchester received 
components of old Colossi.18 
Copeland writes: 
Some machines did survive the dissolution of Newmanry [the Bletchley Park section]. Two 
Colossi made the move from Bletchley Park to Eastcote, and then eventually on to 
Cheltenham. They were accompanied by two of the replica Tunny machines manufactured 
at [GPO research station] Dollis Hill. One of the Colossi, known as “Colossus Blue” at GCHQ, 
was dismantled in 1959 after 14 years of post-war service. The remaining Colossus is 
believed to have stopped running in 1960.19 
The two post-war Colossi had several uses. They almost certainly continued to be used for 
cryptanalysis; they were ‘used extensively for training’, at least towards the end of their lives, ‘ex-
Newmanry engineers developed a random noise generator’, employing ‘some of Flower’s circuitry 
from Colossus’ to generate one-time pads, random secret keys used in encryption. 
In 1952, GCHQ began its move, completed in 1954, from Eastcote to a new, spacious site at 
Cheltenham. The expansion came with a generous boost in new funding, agreed to at a meeting on 
22 January 1952 between the British Chiefs of Staff and the Permanent Under-Secretary of the 
Foreign Office; the resulting five-year plan, designated “Methods to Improve”, paid for what Aldrich 
describes as ‘larger computers and “high speed analytical equipment” for renewed attacks on high-
grade Soviet communications’.20 At Eastcote and Cheltenham, GCHQ undertook several projects 
drawing on contemporary experiments in computing and electronic memory storage. In the 2000s, 
historian of computing Simon Lavington has been able to trace this early history based on 
declassified information.21 First, the Colossus Red was “rebuilt in a more generalised form” between 
1948 and 1951; second, four “Robinsons [war-time cryptanalytic machines, smaller than Colossus] 
were installed at Eastcote using Colossus type circuits, tape readers and output printers”, an 
upgraded Robinson project was called ‘Johnson’; third, technical staff from GCHQ spent time at 
Manchester University, and transferred the magnetic drum technology back, resulting in a machine 
called Colorob, which was designed to “combine the functionality of Colossus and Robinson” but 
although begun by 1952 not operational until 1960.22 Fourth, GCHQ purchased a Ferranti Mark I Star 
general-purpose electronic computer, which was in operation at Cheltenham in mid-1954.23  
Finally, drawing on the Ferranti Mark I Star’s drum design, Tony Ridlington designed GCHQ’s own 
special-purpose machine, Oedipus, running by May 1954.24 Oedipus, ‘a rapid pattern-matching 
machine’, writes Lavington, ‘was in fact the first GCHQ machine to fully exploit the potential of high-
speed digital storage’. Specifically, Oedipus compared plausible transforms of around 10,000 15-
character phrases with incoming text, and ranked the results by a measure of importance. As 
Lavington says, such a machine had to be extremely fast and required a ‘huge amount of internal 
direct-access memory’.25 Indeed, these demands were ‘well beyond the capability of early 1950s 
general-purpose stored-program computers’, which is why Oedipus was a special-purpose electronic 
machine. Technologies used were magnetic drum storage (holding 768,000 digits, from Ferranti and 
Manchester), read-only memory made of semiconductor diodes (designed by GCHQ and built by 
Elliott Brothers), and Williams tubes (also from Manchester). Input was by 200-character per second 
optical tape reader (from Ferranti) and output by Hollerith punched cards. Lavington shows that 
Oedipus could implement more instructions per second and had larger online storage than any mid-
1950s computer.26 ‘The significance of Oedipus was that it was a powerful rapid-character-
comparison machine with a capability greatly exceeding that of any general stored programme 
machine available commercially in the 1950s and 1960s’, writes Aldrich, who goes further than 
Lavington by stating what the target of the machine was: much of ‘this elaborate technology was 
devoted to unsuccessful attacks on high-grade Soviet diplomatic cyphers’.27 
In 1958 a second ‘Methods to Improve’ five year plan started, channelling funds into signals 
intelligence. IBM computers were purchased. ‘GCHQ bought IBM computers not only because of 
NSA compatibility, but because its machines were cutting edge’, says Aldrich.28  Burke, in his history 
of NSA computing, notes that this moment was ‘sad’:  
the crypto-technology tables had been turned. No longer was the United States a dependent 
waiting for the secrets of the British Bombe to be sent from GC&CS. Millions were to be 
spent to provide Britain with a new computer so that it could continue its anti-[redacted] 
research.29 
However, by 1962, with costs rising and no success with breaking Soviet codes, a ‘comprehensive 
review’ of GCHQ, with the initial aim of cutting costs, was launched, chaired by an Oxford don Sir 
Stuart Hampshire.30 ‘Remarkably, after much debate GCHQ got its money’, notes Aldrich, after 1962 
‘the budgets of most of Britain’s overseas departments went down by 10 per cent, but the sigint 
budget went up by the same amount’. The trump card was the unwillingness to disturb the close 
UKUSA relationship (‘UKUSA’ was the official label for UK-USA signals intelligence agreements). 31 
Between the 1960s and 1970s, two very significant trends intersected. The first was the drive to 
computerise the vast paper and card databases (registries that were among the largest in Britain32, 
card indexes, etc) and make them searchable by keyword. Computing was no longer just for 
cryptanalysis but enabled other tasks too. The second was the use of information technologies to 
share such data, as well as sigint, with allies across government and with national partners. 
Furthermore, with the opening of satellite communications systems the quantity of available signals 
was multiplying rapidly. The establishment in the 1960s of GCHQ Bude in Cornwall, near enough to 
the satellite earth station at Goonhilly Downs and next to the beachhead of the undersea Atlantic 
telephone cables, made prodigious amounts of data available to the UKUSA intelligence community.  
The NSA and GCHQ developed ‘revolutionary new systems for analysing and distributing the huge 
volume of intelligence intercepts, with computers being used to search for keywords that indicated 
subjects of interest’.33 The system that ‘combed the traffic for keywords and predesignated phrases’ 
and shared the data according to access clearances was called ‘Dictionary’, available from 1969. 
The development of methods to share intelligence electronically had its immediate origins in a US 
project begun in 1965 called COINS (Community On-line Intelligence System), which would allow the 
NSA to share files and give the Pentagon and State Department “read only” access.34 COINS in the US 
was failing, but in 1969 the UK, in the form of Dick White, the Cabinet Office intelligence coordinator 
and Joe Hooper, the director of GCHQ, took inspiration from it, although they also noted 
considerable problems, including duplication of files, non-standardisation of file formats, faults in 
the system itself, and, in an early hint of catastrophic problems – think of Chelsea Manning – that 
would lie ahead, the ‘problem of restricting access to any given information so that is available only 
to those with a need to know and authorised to receive it’.35 
Further moves to coordinate automatic data processing were in place by the early 1970s, and some 
of the preliminary developments are discussed below.  
We also know that  
In 1967, Ken Sly, who had commanded the sigint unit at Hong Kong, took over from 
Nicodemus Doniach as head of a GCHQ branch called the Joint Technical Language Service, a 
group of thirty highly qualified linguists who not only undertook translations, but also 
compiled material ranging from dictionaries of Soviet military terms to handbooks of Arab 
names. When Sly took over they were working from a vast wall of index cards thirty yards 
long. He began a determined programme of computerisation, so this vast body of 
knowledge gradually became available to everyone in GCHQ. This change was of the first 
importance. GCHQ could see that computers were the shape of the future, and wanted to 
use them to improve every stage of the intelligence process.36 
In the 1970s ‘the old “blue jacket” files full of sigint intercepts started to disappear, and online 
access for policy-makers slowly began to take over’.37 Computers were used to cut staff numbers in 
the mid-1970s as part of a search for cuts.38  
In 1976, GCHQ placed an order for one of Seymour Cray’s first supercomputers. The machine, 
delivered the following year, required a new building (Benhall) and organisation (X Division), but the 
increased speed and power paid dividends: the NSA’s Crays recovered the ‘long-lost ability’ to break 
high-level Soviet communications between embassies in 1976.39 Likewise, on the front-line of 
eavesdropping, small computers – in the form of Honeywell terminals, on advice of the NSA, which 
used the same – became part of the measures needed to process the increasing quantities of sigint. 
‘Keepnet’ improved recording, while ‘Livebait’ improved comparison of data, not least through the 
distinctive secret state technology of wordsearch.40 MI5 was demanding a small computer in 1975.41 
If terminals and small computers was one technical trend familiar to historians of computing that 
was adopted within the secret state, the other big trend, towards networks, will certainly be the 
primary focus of future historians. With the revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013 the fact and 
extent of global surveillance of computer networks by the NSA and GCHQ, among other agencies, 
has been headline news. It will be many years, however, before historians, working directly with 
primary documents, will be able to separate claims from counterclaims. One interesting preliminary 
finding, however, is that GCHQ was relatively late to the surveillance of internet networks. Aldrich 
suggests that a mind-set that still defined the main enemy as the monolithic Soviet Union, hampered 
designs for new systems based around networked computers.42 But once the transition began, 
internet sources became major targets of surveillance.  
 
 (2) The characteristic technical demands of the secret state, and (3) consequences for the 
computer industry 
My second hypothesis – that signals intelligence generated computing tasks characterised by large 
quantities of data subjected to speedy, repetitive, relatively simple analysis, leading to technical 
demands on the size of memories, peripheral technologies (storage of data), and fast computing – 
and my third hypothesis – that the demands of the secret state in computing shaped the 
development of the computer industry – are best considered together.  
We have already seen that GCHQ requested and received supercomputers, evidence that speed of 
operation was a desirable priority. We have also already discussed how early post-war GCHQ 
computing projects featured special-purpose bespoke machines that were unusual in their capacity 
to store and make fast comparisons between data. Other secret state projects raised particular 
technical demands.  
For example, one method of electronic signals intelligence (electronic sigint also called “elint”) 
gathering was to place eavesdropping equipment in aircraft that could fly near the borders of the 
Eastern Bloc. In 1954, a substantial, expensive project was approved by the Treasury to build three 
dedicated sigint platforms using the new de Havilland Comet C2 aircraft.43 The Comet sigint project 
was nearly derailed when a fire in a hangar in 1959 destroyed one aircraft. In a way that is 
comparable to the Admiralty’s need to squeeze more capacity out of the limited space offered by 
available ship space, the ‘task to cram a whole mini-sigint ground station into the cramped interior 
of an airliner’ created demands for miniaturisation in components and in design, and for automation 
to replace bulky human operators with machines.44. Later in the 1970s, next generation Nimrod R1 
sigint aircraft came into service, ‘state-of-the-art’ spy planes that complemented American satellite 
capabilities and ‘offered something no other European country had … something that marked Britain 
out as special’.45 Plessey provided the sideways-looking elint system. Aldrich remarks on the 
transition from Comet to Nimrod that further automation of the human operator was by design: 
The existing Comet aircraft depended on teams of human operators wearing headphones 
who undertook the reception and analysis manually, using narrow-band receivers. However, 
the growing density and complexity of electronic signals meant that they were simply being 
overwhelmed. It was ‘impossible for the operator to sort out and examine all the active 
transmissions’ in the limited time that an aircraft spent over the search area. This meant 
that the most interesting material, the unusual signals that might mean new enemy 
equipment, was being lost. Plessey’s new system was designed to do much of the work of 
the operator, and store what it detected for leisurely analysis after the aircraft had returned 
from its mission.46 
In other areas, too, a distinctive feature of sigint was the sheer volume of data that needed to be 
stored and analysed. One of the greatest intelligence coups of the period was the tapping of Soviet 
messages from a tunnel under Berlin in the 1950s by a joint operation of the CIA and the Secret 
Intelligence Service (MI6). It lasted until 1956. Aldrich notes the scale of the eavesdropping, but also 
the combination of basic magnetic tape technology and manual processing: 
Some twenty-eight telegraphic circuits and 121 voice circuits were being monitored at any 
one time. Voice traffic was recorded on fifty thousand reels of magnetic tape, amounting to 
twenty-five tons of material. At the peak of operation the voice processing centre at Chester 
Terrace, overlooking Regent’s Park in London, employed 317 people, and eventually 368,000 
conversations were transcribed. The teletype processing centre employed a further 350 
people. For each day of the tunnel’s operation the output was four thousand feet of teletype 
messages.47 
Likewise when in the 1960s and 1970s telephone calls were increasingly sent by microwave radio 
link and, even more so, by satellite uplink and downlink, a ‘veritable fountain of intelligence’, 
‘inconceivable volumes of material … too large for any human to read’, the secret state was 
presented with dramatic spikes in quantities of data.48 And again, as the turn towards internet 
surveillance was made in the 1990s, NSA and GCHQ were initially ‘simply overwhelmed by a tidal 
wave of data’.49 The response, however, was data storage projects, at Cheltenham and in Utah, that 
are certainly amongst the biggest and most expensive in history. All of this gear had to be made by 
industry, and therefore we must expect to find significant pressures on technical development and 
the directions of industrial sector growth. 
My suspicion is that we are not yet seeing this industrial influence because only the earlier records 
are available for direct study. Plessey, which built the key electronic systems for Nimrod R1, was 
predominantly a defence contractor, and so this contract was one of other similar demands, and so 
did not disturb that company’s relationship with its main patron, the UK government. Other 
companies, however, had more diverse portfolios. Even though Ferranti and Elliott Brothers were 
sub-contractors, Lavington argues that ‘Security considerations ensured that [Oedipus’s] design had 
no discernible impact on the history of general-purpose computer development’.50 There may have 
been an ‘indirect’ effect on Ferranti by ‘helping to refine the company’s drum technology’, but for 
Elliott Brothers, this special-one-off machine was a distraction, and the ‘technological spin-off was 
minimal’.51 
‘GCHQ’s impact on computer development’, writes Aldrich, ‘was not as great as that of NSA’.52 
Aldrich notes that the National Security Agency (NSA), GCHQ’s US equivalent, has been ‘able to claim 
a string of very considerable computer firsts’, including the ‘first parallel electronic computer with a 
drum memory’ (Atlas 1, 1950), ‘the first core memory computer’ (Atlas 2, 1953), the ‘first computer 
that relied wholly on transistors’ (Solo, 1958), and ‘the first large computer with a completely 
automated tape library’ (Harvest, 1962). These American achievements were not only firsts, but fed 
back to drive civil computer development. Solo was the model for Philco’s commercial computers, 
for example, while Harvest ‘influenced the design of the IBM System 360’.  
Burke tells us that ‘On top of the special computing needs of cryptanalysis, NSA’s insatiable need for 
what many times was unique data processing equipment’ was what made it a ‘computer leader’, in 
the sense of shaping the development of the computer industry. Furthermore this ‘influence’ was 
not … because of its mathematical wizardry or because it has a mandate to transfer 
technology  to the private sector. The Agency’s contributions have become because of the 
unique nature of cryptanalysis and SIGINT and the increasing difficulty of fulfilling a central 
responsibility: the production of signals intelligence.53 
The influence in the United States then was due to specific needs, which generated specific contracts 
for specific kinds of computing technology (big data, fast, later parallel, processing) that encouraged 
industry in certain directions. The contract for Nomad – in the end a failure – which went to IBM 
was, says, Burke, nevertheless ‘a great prize, and in some ways more important to the computer 
industry than the massive Sage early-warning computer project that IBM was taking on’.54 This 
statement alone should make historians of computing sit up, given the importance accredited to 
Sage by, for example, Paul Edwards.55 Furthermore, by the late 1950s, NSA was not merely handing 
out very large contracts, but was, as part of moves explicitly drawn as a parallel to the Manhattan 
Project, but also became ‘a sponsor of basic research within industry’, a second route of influence.56 
So, in the eyes of the two historians who have mostly closely studied this question, the NSA had a 
major influence on post-war computing, less so GCHQ. Why this difference? First, it might be an 
artefact – a result of the contrast between total silence in public about GCHQ and the severely 
limited but nevertheless present public knowledge, often circulated for political alliance-
maintenance, of the NSA’s activities. Second, perhaps the demand for computing power was 
quantitatively greater from NSA compared to GCHQ. The NSA’s director boasted of ‘over a hundred 
computers occupying almost five acres of floor space’ by 1968.57 Third, GCHQ began purchasing 
American machines: IBM 360s, IBM 700s and Crays. In this way, GCHQ added to the strength of 
American computing industry. 
Nevertheless, there is some counter evidence that suggests that the choices of the UK security state 
might have been indirectly significant for the development of the UK computer industry. Even before 
GCHQ was choosing Cray supercomputers and Honeywell terminals, in 1972 the JIC sub-committee 
on data processing considered what was called ‘commercial-in-confidence’ information about an 
IBM emulator of the ICL1900 series of large mainframe computers. This was significant because IBM 
vs ICL was a decision of national interest, and ICL1900 machines were being purchased elsewhere, 
for example for the Defence Intelligence Service, while GCHQ could justify IBM machines.58  
But there were also other countervailing effects. There was much debate about the security 
problems of using software firms, for example in the early 1970s.59 This meant there was pressure to 
write software in house, which must, first, have been increasingly difficult as the scale of software 
increased, and, second, meant that the shaping influence must have been blunted. I return to this 
point below. 
(4) Opportunity costs 
My fourth hypothesis was that there were opportunity costs – the absorption of trained staff drew 
skills and knowledge away from civil sectors. For Oedipus, Elliott Brothers were at first in the frame 
to be the sole contractor. But, Lavington says, the company wanted to complete its other projects, 
including a nickel delay line memory for its 401 series of commercial computers. Lavington quotes 
Ridlington, the GCHQ engineer, that Oedipus “was too much for Borehamwood [Elliott’s factory, 
neat Eastcote], so it was decided that GCHQ would do the project in-house with Elliott and Ferranti 
as major sub-contractors”.60 Aldrich tells us that GCHQ’s “Methods to Improve” programme was 
given very high priority, with suppliers informed of this fact.61 Combining these two points it is 
plausible that Oedipus pulled resources away from other, more economically productive, post-war 
computing projects. Nevertheless, the fact that Ferranti and Elliot staff were working on such 
specialist tasks meant that the firms were developing knowledge within the company. While there 
might have been temporary delays to progress on civil projects, this knowledge could plausibly have 
been drawn upon for innovation in the longer term. 
(5) Continuities with Whitehall computerisation 
My fifth hypothesis was that, in common with the rest of Whitehall, mechanisation and 
computerisation of clerical tasks was widespread and significantly shaped capacity for 
administration. Since the mechanisation of clerical tasks was regarded as relatively non-sensitive, 
documents relating to clerical ‘automation’ have been released at the National Archives and provide 
a more detailed glimpse into this aspect of secret computing. 
MI5 adopted Hollerith punched card methods, a move away from pure filing, during the Second 
World War.62 However, we need more research, and more detailed sources, to discuss the extent to 
which mechanisation presaged computerisation.  
In 1961, the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB) produced a document on ‘automation’.63 It considered two 
types: ‘storage and recovery of reports and facts’ and ‘data processing’. On the first, it noted that 
the CIA (‘and possibly other intelligence agencies’) in the United States were considering moving 
from a ‘complex of index sub-systems, most of which rely on commercially available punched card 
systems’ to ‘a new structure of document holding’, with micro-photographic and magnetic tape 
storage both options. The JIB considered that it would be necessary to ‘keep in touch’, and ‘if we do 
follow their example, and store information mechanically, we should probably use the same type of 
equipment’. On data processing, the JIB thought that progress in the United States was slow, oddly 
‘because of the opposition of scholarship to the idea that a machine can simulate mental processes’. 
Nevertheless, a ‘good deal of work’ was being done on ‘mechanised translation’, adding: 
Those in favour of more automatic data processing in intelligence work point out that a very 
large part of an analyst’s work is collative rather than decision making. Comparisons are 
made with predetermined criteria, and this a mechanical system can do. 
By 1967 a more serious look at electronic data processing was underway. For example a paper on 
‘The use of computers in the diplomatic service’ was circulating. It was suggested that Treasury 
O&M, the experts, should be tapped. Others were more generally sceptical: 
Probably most people first considering the uses of computers in a new field are, as a result 
of years of shameless commercial propaganda about computer potential, left with a guilty 
feeling that all one’s problems could be solved in one incredibly efficient system – if only one 
were clever enough to devise one. 
If we could collect the inputs and model the Russian computer system with a clear 
knowledge of what aims had been set, we should know what automatic decisions (“machine 
judgements”) were being made and would also have available the facts in the form 
presented to human decision makers. But we cannot assume that their decisions will be 
logical, and it would require human intellect to judge what these decisions might be. One 
can weigh facts and derive probabilities, but not quantify illogical functions like Russian 
patriotic pride in Space achievements, or, in China, the fear of producing a scientific elite 
class, or, in Greece, King Constantine’s sense of dynastic duty.64 
The Automation working party pulled together interests in mechanisation and computerisation from 
across the secret state. Some interesting facts were aired: 
Mr Christie, of GCHQ, told the meeting that GCHQ had had data banks in operation for some 
years. These are now being enlarged and the new systems will have a disc store with a 
capacity of some 200 million characters. Remote access stations should be in operation in a 
year or 18 months, and in 1970/71 there should be the possibility of providing departments 
in London with remote access equipment, at a cost of about £11,000 per terminal including 
crypto equipment. 65 
In comparison, Treasury O&M stated that the ‘largest disc file’ available was about 400 million 
characters, while the Home Office was already bringing in a system with multiple access of 600 
terminals.66 
A new sub-committee on automatic data processing of the JIC was set up in 1969, with 
representatives from GCHQ, MI5, MI6 and the DIS section of the Ministry of Defence.67 Its brief was 
to investigate requirements for ADP among the UK intelligence community, study applications, make 
recommendations, and offer advice, all while keeping an eye on the needs of international 
collaboration.68  
After this date, direct sight of primary documents begins to dry up. MI6 and GCHQ were in 
discussion about automatic data processing (ADP) for payroll in 1976.69 We know that some of the 
computerisation of the secret state ran into the budget overruns and occasional failure that marked 
the civil projects. Infamous examples are the overrun of the Project Pindar Whitehall defence bunker 
and the abandonment of the Defence Intelligence Staff system called ‘Trawlerman’ (1988-1996) and 
the MI5 system called ‘Grant’.70 
 
(6) Technological innovations that originated in response to problems raised by the secret state 
sometimes spread out to civil applications 
Neither secret state organisations nor their contractors and collaborating research organisations 
were likely to shout about spin offs to civil applications. This discretion makes tracking such effects 
difficult. However, especially around the penumbra of the secret state, some fascinating connections 
can be found.  
We’ve already seen that it was thought that the US was making progress on mechanised translation 
for intelligence in 1960. What GCHQ really ‘thirsted for’, notes Aldrich, was ‘progress on machine 
translation that would do some of the jobs currently undertaken by linguists, but so far this had 
failed on grounds of high costs and complexity’.71 The demand was widespread across the Western 
secret states, and prompted visits to the UK by US experts in 196672, and discussion of a French 
proposal for a NATO project in 1968.73 From 1959, a team at the Autonomics Division of the National 
Physical Laboratory, a body most familiar to historians of computing as one of the locations of 
innovations in packet-switching techniques74, was working on computerised translation of Russian 
scientific texts into English. In 1967 it issued a report, a ‘comprehensive account’, summarising 
evaluations of the usefulness of different procedures, concluding that the ’results give clear evidence 
that the basis of a genuinely useful automatic translation service has been achieved’.75 The probable 
principle customer for such research can be inferred from the following: 
It would not be the role of the NPL to provide a production translation service based on our 
system, so we look to some other agency to enquire further into this problem. However, it 
will be our continuing concern to seek to interest and advise the several agencies who may 
wish to assess the viability of a production service, based on the techniques we have now 
proven.76 
On the way, the NPL team had built components of ‘considerable independent importance’, 
including am ‘automatic Russian-English dictionary, covering all forms of some 17,000 Russian 
words, and available on punched cards’, a ‘scheme of comprehensive morphological representation’, 
and ‘detailed methods of Russian syntactic analysis and computer model of linguistic structure, 
capable of wide application’; all of these, along with advice, were available to ‘bona-fide 
researchers’.77 
We might assume (but cannot yet prove) that NPL were not working for eight years merely on the 
hope that it might interest agencies in the secret state, but that contact was both more substantial 
and communications flowed two-way. There is a further twist. The machine translation work at NPL 
found an output in civil policing.78 It fed into plans for a C11 branch criminal intelligence computer 
project – the “supertec” (a nickname the media gave, disliked by the civil servants). The connection 
back to the NPL, and perhaps therefore back to the secret state is referred to only briefly: 
The computer will speak English. You will type (in plain English) questions to it, and it will 
answer. It will even look up words it does not know, and learn as it goes… The programming 
is done at the National Physical Laboratory … they learnt a great deal from their earlier work 
in translating English and Chinese and Russian into each other.79 
Universities, too, also sought to interest secret state patrons. For example, in the same period the 
Cambridge Language Research Unit proposed an ‘automated reactive dictionary’ and requested 
support from the Defence Intelligence Staff. While this specific request was refused because an 
alternative partially-automate ‘simple and fully adequate solution’ seemed available, the discussion 
also recorded the interested parties:  
(a) The Security Service were chiefly interested in general translations from languages in the 
Communist bloc. 
(b) MI6 were interested 
(c) GCHQ (and NSA) were already involved in this general area of work and would probably 
have a requirement for any system proposed. 
(d) The Foreign Office should be consulted at some stage.80 
Furthermore, machine translation was not simply a response to the overwhelming flood of 
potentially important intelligence from the Eastern Bloc, the requirement for Western countries to 
cooperate, such as through NATO, also increased demand for translation services, as one official 
noted: ‘the requirement was now much greater than before and much of it arose from our 
participation in NATO and other international organisations which sponsored joint projects’.81 
The whole area of the transfer of innovations between the secret state and the non-secret state, as 
well as between policing and civil researchers deserves much more scrutiny from historians of 
science and technology. Another interesting example of where policing technology was sourced, for 
example, was the translation of technology developed at University College London in the 1970s to 
analyse bubble chamber tracks automatically subsequently applied to automatic vehicle number 
plate readers for the Home Office and police.82 
 
(7) Security was a constraint, raising its own problems and socio-technical solutions. 
The agencies of the secret state have a particular, shared concern with security. In particular, they 
not only wanted their own communications to be secure, and wanted to subvert the 
communications security of their targets. Much of Bletchley Park’s ingenuity was, of course, devoted 
to solutions of the latter. In the post-war period this focus remained, throwing up problems and 
demanding socio-technical solutions. Another problem was that as electrical equipment, including 
computer terminals, electric typewriters and other peripherals, were introduced in the name of 
office efficiency, so there was an increased danger that such equipment might, through detectable 
signals generated in operation, become a serious security risk.83 The discovery that cypher machines 
radiated detectable signals over a hundred yards (a problem called “Tempest”) was made in the 
1950s.84 In the mid-1960s, the Joint Intelligence Committee’s Automation Working Party (on which 
all agencies were represented) expressed interest in electrical ‘tape-controlled typewriters’, but 
these had ‘radiation’ problems, and therefore required ‘purpose-built intelligence centres with 
adequate physical and electronic security’.85 Later, GCHQ investigated the security weaknesses of 
IBM 2260 visual displays, an episode that shows there were exchanges back and forth between 
security agency and computer manufacturer.86  
As programming, rather than hardware, became the most costly component in developing computer 
projects in the 1960s (leading to the so-called “software crisis”), so writing software securely in 
house became untenable, another major security issue for the secret state. Moreover there was 
political pressure to encourage the sector, and this too ran against security interests. As the chair of 
the Joint Intelligence Committee working party reflected in 1972: 
It was national policy to make use of software firms where appropriate. It was his view that 
software contracts, like any other contracts be placed with selected firms where profitable, 
and where practicable within the necessarily stringent security constraints applicable in the 
intelligence field. In the case of GCHQ this was likely to exclude general purpose computer 
work but could include certain total special purpose computer-based systems.87 
In discussion, the ‘general view emerged that from the security angle, there were considerable 
difficulties involved in dealing with software firms, stemming from the need to involve 
manufacturers  at a very early stage, … [but an] apparently unclassified project could unexpectedly 
turn out to involve highly classified problems relating to operational files. One general point to 
notice is that these restrictions might have constrained the secret state’s influence on the 
developing computing industry in ways that meant it did not have the impact its sheer size might 
lead us to expect. 
Finally, there were similar problems raised by tension between the benefits from sharing 
information within the secret state and the dangers of unauthorised access. GCHQ advised on 
remote access computer terminals in 1969. It noted that commercial remote access facilities, for 
example IBM’s, could be adapted with ‘special interface units’ so that they could be combined with 
‘modern cryptographic equipment’.88 Cryptographic protection was essential of course. At this time, 
in 1969, GCHQ’s ‘conventional teleprinter’ operating at 100 words per minute (75 bits/second), 
costing £500, was made secure using the UK on-line cypher equipment called Alvis, which added a 
cost of £1500. When higher-speeds were available then new crypto equipment would be needed. 
This was likely ‘before the mid-seventies’ – by which point, presumably, Alvis had left the building. 
 
Conclusion 
The reliable historical sources on the computing projects, interests and influence of the secret state 
of the United Kingdom are few in number and most primary sources are still retained under the 
Official Secrets Act. Nevertheless, in this paper I have proposed seven hypotheses, and discussed 
what evidence might address them. My assessment of each hypothesis would be as follows. First, 
the UK secret state was indeed a major user of computing technologies, and within the secret state, 
signals intelligence was the heaviest user. Second, signals intelligence generated computing tasks 
characterised by large quantities of data subjected to speedy, repetitive, relatively simple analysis., 
which in turn put particular emphasis on seeing developed, with select industrial partners, larger 
memories, other peripheral technologies, and techniques of fast computing. Nevertheless, third, the 
dimensions of influence of these demands of the secret state on the computing industry, especially 
UK industry, are still unclear. Fourth, in this interaction with industry there were probable 
opportunity costs. Fifth, in common with the rest of Whitehall there was widespread interest in the 
application of automatic data processing to office work, including the specific information and 
document handling peculiar to the intelligence world. One reason that picture is clearer on this point 
is that the subject of automatic data processing was regarded as relatively mundane and therefore 
less sensitive. Sixth, while it is not proven that technological innovations spread from the secret 
state to civilian applications, it was shown that there were shared interests and probable patronage, 
as well as presumably less documented conversations. Finally, security was indeed a constraint, 
raising problems and calling for solutions. This understandable restriction might provide part of the 
answer of why the secret state, despite being a major customer for information technologies, can 
only be shown – so far – to have had an ambiguous, even limited, effect on the computing industry. 
In general, however, the overall question – what is the place of the secret state in the history of 
computing – deserves more scrutiny from historians, especially as new sources are revealed. 
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